

# Criminal & Civil Justice Policy Council

Monday, March 22, 2010 1:00 PM 404 HOB

**Council Actions** 

#### **Criminal & Civil Justice Policy Council**

3/22/2010 1:00:00PM

Location: 404 HOB

**Summary:** 

**Criminal & Civil Justice Policy Council** 

Monday March 22, 2010 01:00 pm

Print Date: 3/22/2010 5:33 pm

CS/HB 285 Favorable With Council Substitute	Yeas: 16 Nays: 0
HB 595 Favorable	Yeas: 13 Nays: 0
CS/HB 829 Favorable With Council Substitute	Yeas: 13 Nays: 1
CS/HB 1101 Favorable	Yeas: 16 Nays: 0
HB 1517 Favorable With Council Substitute	Yeas: 13 Nays: 3

#### **Criminal & Civil Justice Policy Council**

3/22/2010 1:00:00PM

Location: 404 HOB

Print Date: 3/22/2010 5:33 pm

#### Attendance:

	Present	Absent	Excused
William Snyder (Chair)	X		
Sandra Adams	X		
Kevin Ambler	X		
Carl Domino	×		
Eric Eisnaugle	x		
Adam M. Fetterman	×		
Luis Garcia	×		
Audrey Gibson	X		
Eduardo Gonzalez	×		
Tom Grady	X		
Doug Holder	X		
Julio Robaina	×		
Robert Schenck	x		
Perry Thurston	X		
James Waldman	X		
Michael Weinstein	×		
Totals:	16	. 0	0

#### **Criminal & Civil Justice Policy Council**

3/22/2010 1:00:00PM

Location: 404 HOB

CS/HB 285 : Parental Authority

X | Favorable With Council Substitute

	Yea	Nay	No Vote	Absentee Yea	Absentee Nay
Sandra Adams				Х	
Kevin Ambler	X				
Carl Domino	X				
Eric Eisnaugle	Х				
Adam M. Fetterman	X				
Luis Garcia	X				
Audrey Gibson	X				
Eduardo Gonzalez	X				
Tom Grady	X				
Doug Holder	X				
Julio Robaina	X				
Robert Schenck	X				
Perry Thurston	X				
James Waldman	X				*
Michael Weinstein	X				
Adam Hasner (Ex Officio)	X				· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
William Snyder (Chair)	X				
	Total Yeas: 16	Total Nays: (	0		

#### **Appearances:**

HB 285 Parental Authority
Michael Haggard, President (General Public) - Proponent
Florida Justice Association

13505 SW 72nd Avenue

Miami FL 33156 Phone: 305-446-5700

HB 285 Parental Authority
Mary-Lynn Cullen, Legislative Liaison (Lobbyist) - Proponent
Advocacy Institute for Children
1674 University

Sarasota FL 34243 Phone: 941-928-0278

HB 285 Parental Authority
Stacey Webb (Lobbyist) - Proponent
International Speedway Corp
120 S Monroe St
Tallahasson El 32311

Tallahassee FL 32311 Phone: 850-671-4401

Print Date: 3/22/2010 5:33 pm

#### **Criminal & Civil Justice Policy Council**

3/22/2010 1:00:00PM

Location: 404 HOB

HB 285 Parental Authority
Winn Peeples (Lobbyist) - Proponent
Florida Trail Riders Association/Unlimited Sports MX
207 W Park Avenue, Suite 13
Tallahassee FL 32301

Phone: 850-524-2039

Phone: 850-222-0720

Print Date: 3/22/2010 5:33 pm

HB 285 Parental Authority
Bob Harris (Lobbyist) - Opponent
 Diving Equipment and Marketing Association (DEMA)
2618 Centennial Place
Tallahassee FL 32308

COUNCIL/COMMITTEE	ACTION	The state of the s
ADOPTED	(Y/N)	to some replications
ADOPTED AS AMENDED	(Y/N)	Bor On
ADOPTED W/O OBJECTION	(Y/N)	Old Mr. Mys
FAILED TO ADOPT	(Y/N)	Our Son.
WITHDRAWN	(Y/N)	5W
OTHER	***************************************	

Council/Committee hearing bill: Criminal & Civil Justice Policy Council

Representative(s) Horner offered the following:

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#### Amendment (with title amendment)

Remove everything after the enacting clause and insert:

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- Section 1. Paragraph (g) of subsection (1) and subsection (3) of section 549.09, Florida Statutes, are amended to read:
  - 549.09 Motorsport nonspectator liability release.-
  - (1) As used in this section:
- (g) "Nonspectators" means event participants who have signed a motorsport liability release, including a minor if the minor's parent or guardian has also signed the release.
- (3) (a) A motorsport liability release may be signed by more than one person if so long as the release form appears on each page, or side of a page, which is signed. A motorsport liability release shall be printed in 8 point type or larger.

(b) A release signed by a minor is valid if the release is also signed by the minor's parent or quardian.

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Section 2. Section 768.38, Florida Statutes is created to read:

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768.38 Liability waivers executed on behalf of minor children. -

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(1) LEGISLATIVE FINDINGS AND INTENT - The Legislature finds and declares that it is the policy of this state that:

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(a) Children of this state should have the maximum opportunity to participate in sporting, recreational, educational, and other activities despite the fact that certain risks may exist when participating in these activities.

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(b) Public, private, and non-profit entities providing
these activities to children in Florida need a measure of
protection against lawsuits, and these entities may be unwilling
or unable to provide the activities without such protection.

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(c) Parents have a fundamental right and responsibility to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children and the law has long presumed that parents act in

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(d) Parents make conscious choices every day on behalf of their children concerning the risks and benefits of participation in activities.

the best interest of their children.

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(e) These are proper parental choices on behalf of children that should not be ignored, and so long as a parent's decision is voluntary and informed, the decision should be given the same

dignity as decisions regarding schooling, medical treatment, and religious education.

- (f) It is the intent of this state to encourage the affordability of youth activities in this state by permitting a parent of a child to release a prospective negligence claim of the child against certain persons and entities involved in providing the opportunity to participate in the activities.
  - (2) DEFINITIONS As used in this section the term:
  - (a) "Child" means a person less than eighteen years of age.
- (b) "Parent" means a child's biological mother or father, adoptive mother or father, or legal guardian.
- (3) A parent of a child may, on behalf of the child, release or waive the child's prospective claim for negligence.
- (4) Nothing in this section shall be construed to permit a parent acting on behalf of his or her child to waive the child's prospective claim against a person or entity for intentional misconduct or for a grossly negligent act or omission.
  - Section 3. This act shall take effect upon becoming a law.

#### TITLE AMENDMENT

Remove the entire title and insert:

An act relating to parental authority; amending s. 549.09, F.S.; providing that a motorsport liability release signed by a minor is valid if the release is also signed by the minor's parent or guardian; creating s. 768.38, F.S.; authorizing a parent to waive and release a negligence claim on behalf of their child; providing an exclusion for

# COUNCIL/COMMITTEE AMENDMENT Bill No. CS/HB 285 (2010)

# Amendment No. 1 74 intentional misconduct and gross negligence; providing an 75 effective date.

### am 1 to am 1

Amendment No. 1a

Bill No. CS/HB 285 (2010)

COUNCIL	/COMMITTEE	ACTION			
ADOPTED		(Y/N)		<b>.</b>	
ADOPTED AS A	MENDED	(Y/N)		ble	
ADOPTED W/O	OBJECTION	(Y/N)		119 D.	10 My m
FAILED TO AD	OPT	(Y/N)	K	N. 20	ind sommer
WITHDRAWN		(Y/N)			all Robber
OTHER		No. of Contract of		Dun's	oded by our and
Council	Schi	,	iminal &	Civil Ju	stice Policy
title amendm Remove	ent) line(s) 62	ment (1) by I and insert:	_		
Remove misconduct, omission.	ent) line(s) 62 sexual misc	and insert: onduct, or fo	or a gros	sly negl	
Remove misconduct, omission.	line(s) 62 sexual misc  TIT  line(s) 74	and insert: onduct, or fo	or a gros	sly negl	igent act or
Remove misconduct, omission.	line(s) 62 sexual misc  TIT  line(s) 74 misconduct,	and insert: onduct, or for the AME and insert: including se	or a gros	sly negl	igent act or

## am 2 to am 1

used in this section:

Amendment No.

COUNCIL/	COMMITTEE	ACTION
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ADOPTED	(Y/N)				
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ADOPTED W/O O	BJECTION	<b></b>	(Y/N)	\	m. 30
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WITHDRAWN	(Y/N)				
OTHER					

Council/Committee hearing bill: Criminal & Civil Justice Policy Council

Representative Ambler and Robaina offered the following:

# Substitute Amendment to Amendment (1) by Representative Horner (with title amendment)

Remove everything after the enacting clause and insert:
Section 1. Paragraph (g) of subsection (1) and subsection
(3) of section 549.09, Florida Statutes, are amended to read:
549.09 Motorsport nonspectator liability release.—(1) As

- (g) "Nonspectator" "Nonspectators" means an event participant participants who has have signed a motorsport liability release or, in the case of a minor, whose natural guardian has signed a motorsport liability release on behalf of the minor.
- (3)  $\underline{\text{(a)}}$  A motorsport liability release may be signed by more than one person if so long as the release form appears on each

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page, or side of a page, which is signed. A motorsport liability release must shall be printed in 8 point type or larger.

- (b) 1. If a minor is participating in a motorsports event as defined in s. 549.10, the motorsport liability release must comply with the requirements of this section and is valid to the same extent provided for other nonspectators under this section.
- 2. If a minor is participating in an activity at a closed-course motorsport facility, other than a motorsports event as defined in s. 549.10, a waiver or release must comply with the requirements in s. 744.301(3) and is valid only to the extent, and subject to the presumptions, provided in that subsection.

Section 2. Present subsection (3) of section 744.301, Florida Statutes, is redesignated as subsection (4) and amended, and a new subsection (3) is added to that section, to read:

744.301 Natural guardians.—

- (2), natural guardians are authorized, on behalf of any of their minor children, to waive and release, in advance, any claim or cause of action against a commercial activity provider, or its owners, affiliates, employees, or agents, which would accrue to a minor child for personal injury, including death, and property damage resulting from an inherent risk in the activity.
- (a) As used in this subsection, the term "inherent risk" means those dangers or conditions, known or unknown, which are characteristic of, intrinsic to, or an integral part of the activity and which are not eliminated even if the activity provider acts with due care in a reasonably prudent manner. The term includes, but is not limited to:

- 1. The failure by the activity provider to warn the natural guardian or minor child of an inherent risk; and
- 2. The risk that the minor child or another participant in the activity may act in a negligent or intentional manner and contribute to the injury or death of the minor child. A participant does not include the activity provider or its owners, affiliates, employees, or agents.
- (b) To be enforceable, a waiver or release executed under this subsection must, at a minimum, include the following statement in uppercase type that is at least 5 points larger than, and clearly distinguishable from, the rest of the text of the waiver or release:

NOTICE TO THE MINOR CHILD'S NATURAL GUARDIAN

READ THIS FORM COMPLETELY AND CAREFULLY. YOU ARE AGREEING TO LET YOUR MINOR CHILD ENGAGE IN A POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS ACTIVITY. YOU ARE AGREEING THAT, EVEN IF (...name of released party or parties...) USES REASONABLE CARE IN PROVIDING THIS ACTIVITY,

THERE IS A CHANCE YOUR CHILD MAY BE SERIOUSLY INJURED OR KILLED BY PARTICIPATING IN THIS ACTIVITY BECAUSE THERE ARE CERTAIN DANGERS INHERENT IN THE ACTIVITY WHICH CANNOT BE AVOIDED OR ELIMINATED. BY SIGNING THIS FORM YOU ARE GIVING UP YOUR CHILD'S RIGHT AND YOUR RIGHT TO RECOVER FROM (...name of released party or parties...) IN A LAWSUIT FOR ANY PERSONAL INJURY, INCLUDING DEATH, TO YOUR CHILD OR ANY PROPERTY DAMAGE THAT RESULTS FROM THE RISKS THAT ARE A NATURAL PART OF THE ACTIVITY. YOU HAVE THE RIGHT TO REFUSE TO SIGN THIS FORM, AND (...name of released

party or parties...) HAS THE RIGHT TO REFUSE TO LET YOUR CHILD PARTICIPATE IF YOU DO NOT SIGN THIS FORM.

- (c) If a waiver or release complies with paragraph (b) and waives no more than allowed under this subsection, there is a rebuttable presumption that the waiver or release is valid and that any injury or damage to the minor child arose from the inherent risk involved in the activity.
- 1. To rebut the presumption that the waiver or release is valid, a claimant must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the waiver or release does not comply with this subsection.
- 2. To rebut the presumption that the injury or damage to the minor child arose from an inherent risk involved in the activity, a claimant must demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the conduct, condition, or other cause resulting in the injury or damage was not an inherent risk of the activity.
- 3. If a presumption under this paragraph is rebutted, liability and compensatory damages must be established by a preponderance of the evidence.
- (d) Nothing in this subsection limits the ability of natural guardians, on behalf of any of their minor children, to waive and release, in advance, any claim or cause of action against a non-commercial activity provider, or its owners, affiliates, employees, or agents, to the extent authorized by common law.

(4)(3) All instruments executed by a natural guardian for the benefit of the ward under the powers specified in this section are subsection (2) shall be binding on the ward. The natural guardian may not, without a court order, use the property of the ward for the guardian's benefit or to satisfy the guardian's support obligation to the ward.

Section 3. This act shall take effect upon becoming a law.

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#### TITLE AMENDMENT

Remove the entire title and insert:

A bill to be entitled

An act relating to liability releases; amending s. 549.09, F.S.; redefining the term "nonspectators" to include a minor on whose behalf a natural guardian has signed a motorsport liability release; providing that a motorsport liability release signed by a natural guardian on behalf of a minor participating in a sanctioned motorsports event is valid to the same extent as for other nonspectators; limiting the validity of a waiver or release signed by a natural quardian on behalf of a minor participating in an activity at a closed-course motorsport facility other than a sanctioned motorsports event; amending s. 744.301, F.S.; authorizing natural guardians to waive, in advance, claims for injuries arising from risks inherent in a commercial activity; defining the term "inherent risk"; providing a statement that must be included in the waiver; creating a rebuttable presumption that a waiver is valid and that the

# COUNCIL/COMMITTEE AMENDMENT Bill No. CS/HB 285 (2010)

#### Amendment No.

injury arose	from the inherent risk; providing the	
requirements	and standard of evidence for overcoming	the
<pre>presumption;</pre>	authorizing natural guardians to waive,	in
advance, any	claim against a non-commercial provider	to the
extent allowe	ed by common law; providing an effective	date.

(2010)

Bill No. CS/HB 285

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Amendment No. 2

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#### COUNCIL/COMMITTEE ACTION

ADOPTED	(Y/N)	۸
ADOPTED AS AMENDED	(Y/N)	19 2
ADOPTED W/O OBJECTION	(Y/N)	12/02/10
FAILED TO ADOPT	(Y/N)	2.3
WITHDRAWN	(Y/N)	<i>'</i> 'D
OTHER		

Council/Committee hearing bill: Criminal & Civil Justice Policy
Council

Representative(s) Eisnaugle offered the following:

# Substitute Amendment to Amendment (1) by Representative Horner (with title amendment)

Remove everything after the enacting clause and insert: Section 1. Paragraph (g) of subsection (1) and subsection (3) of section 549.09, Florida Statutes, are amended to read:

549.09 Motorsport nonspectator liability release.

- (1) As used in this section:
- (g) "Nonspectator" "Nonspectators" means an event participant participants who has have signed a motorsport liability release or, in the case of a minor, whose natural guardian has signed a motorsport liability release on behalf of the minor.
- (3) (a) A motorsport liability release may be signed by more than one person if so long as the release form appears on each page, or side of a page, which is signed. A motorsport

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liability release  $\underline{\text{must}}$   $\underline{\text{shall}}$  be printed in 8 point type or larger.

- (b) 1. If a minor is participating in a motorsports event as defined in s. 549.10, the motorsport liability release must comply with the requirements of this section and is valid to the same extent provided for other nonspectators under this section.
- 2. If a minor is participating in an activity at a closed-course motorsport facility, other than a motorsports event as defined in s. 549.10, a waiver or release must comply with the requirements in s. 744.301(3) and is valid only to the extent, and subject to the presumptions, provided in that subsection.

Section 2. Present subsection (3) of section 744.301, Florida Statutes, is redesignated as subsection (4) and amended, and a new subsection (3) is added to that section, to read:

744.301 Natural guardians.-

- (2), natural guardians are authorized, on behalf of any of their minor children, to waive and release, in advance, any claim or cause of action against a commercial activity provider, or its owners, affiliates, employees, or agents, which would accrue to a minor child for personal injury, including death, and property damage resulting from an inherent risk in the activity.
- (a) As used in this subsection, the term "inherent risk" means those dangers or conditions, known or unknown, which are characteristic of, intrinsic to, or an integral part of the activity. The term includes, but is not limited to:
- 1. The failure by the activity provider to warn the natural guardian or minor child of an inherent risk; and

- 2. The risk that the minor child or another participant in the activity may act in a negligent or intentional manner and contribute to the injury or death of the minor child. A participant does not include the activity provider or its owners, affiliates, employees, or agents.
- (b) To be enforceable, a waiver or release executed under this subsection must, at a minimum, include the following statement in uppercase type that is at least 5 points larger than, and clearly distinguishable from, the rest of the text of the waiver or release:

NOTICE TO THE MINOR CHILD'S NATURAL GUARDIAN

READ THIS FORM COMPLETELY AND CAREFULLY. YOU ARE
AGREEING TO LET YOUR MINOR CHILD ENGAGE IN A
POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS ACTIVITY. YOU ARE AGREEING THAT,
THERE IS A CHANCE YOUR CHILD MAY BE SERIOUSLY INJURED
OR KILLED BY PARTICIPATING IN THIS ACTIVITY BECAUSE
THERE ARE CERTAIN DANGERS INHERENT IN THE ACTIVITY
WHICH CANNOT BE AVOIDED OR ELIMINATED. BY SIGNING THIS
FORM YOU ARE GIVING UP YOUR CHILD'S RIGHT AND YOUR
RIGHT TO RECOVER FROM (...name of released party or
parties...) IN A LAWSUIT FOR ANY PERSONAL INJURY,
INCLUDING DEATH, TO YOUR CHILD OR ANY PROPERTY DAMAGE
THAT RESULTS FROM THE RISKS THAT ARE A NATURAL PART OF
THE ACTIVITY. YOU HAVE THE RIGHT TO REFUSE TO SIGN
THIS FORM, AND (...name of released party or

parties...) HAS THE RIGHT TO REFUSE TO LET YOUR CHILD PARTICIPATE IF YOU DO NOT SIGN THIS FORM.

- (c) If a waiver or release complies with paragraph (b) and waives no more than allowed under this subsection, there is a rebuttable presumption that the waiver or release is valid and that any injury or damage to the minor child arose from the inherent risk involved in the activity.
- 1. To rebut the presumption that the waiver or release is valid, a claimant must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the waiver or release does not comply with this subsection.
- 2. To rebut the presumption that the injury or damage to the minor child arose from an inherent risk involved in the activity, a claimant must demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the conduct, condition, or other cause resulting in the injury or damage was not an inherent risk of the activity.
- 3. If a presumption under this paragraph is rebutted, liability and compensatory damages must be established by a preponderance of the evidence.
- (d) Nothing in this subsection limits the ability of natural guardians, on behalf of any of their minor children, to waive and release, in advance, any claim or cause of action against a noncommercial activity provider, or its owners, affiliates, employees, or agents, to the extent authorized by common law.

(4)(3) All instruments executed by a natural guardian for the benefit of the ward under the powers specified in this section are subsection (2) shall be binding on the ward. The natural guardian may not, without a court order, use the property of the ward for the guardian's benefit or to satisfy the guardian's support obligation to the ward.

Section 3. This act shall take effect upon becoming a law.

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#### TITLE AMENDMENT

Remove the entire title and insert:

An act relating to liability releases; amending s. 549.09, F.S.; redefining the term "nonspectators" to include a minor on whose behalf a natural quardian has signed a motorsport liability release; providing that a motorsport liability release signed by a natural guardian on behalf of a minor participating in a sanctioned motorsports event is valid to the same extent as for other nonspectators; limiting the validity of a waiver or release signed by a natural quardian on behalf of a minor participating in an activity at a closed-course motorsport facility other than a sanctioned motorsports event; amending s. 744.301, F.S.; authorizing natural quardians to waive, in advance, claims for injuries arising from risks inherent in a commercial activity; defining the term "inherent risk"; providing a statement that must be included in the waiver; creating a rebuttable presumption that a waiver is valid and that the injury arose from the inherent risk; providing the

# COUNCIL/COMMITTEE AMENDMENT Bill No. CS/HB 285 (2010)

Amendment N	١o.	2
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requirements	and standard of evidence for overcoming the
presumption;	authorizing natural guardians to waive, in
advance, any	claim against a noncommercial provider to the
extent allowe	ed by common law; providing an effective date

#### **Criminal & Civil Justice Policy Council**

3/22/2010 1:00:00PM

Location: 404 HOB

HB 595 : Open House Parties

X Favorable

	Yea	Nay	No Vote	Absentee	Absentee
				Yea	Nay
Sandra Adams				X	
Kevin Ambler	X				
Carl Domino				X	
Eric Eisnaugle	X				
Adam M. Fetterman	X				
Luis Garcia	X				
Audrey Gibson	X				
Eduardo Gonzalez	X				
Tom Grady				X	
Doug Holder	X				
Julio Robaina	X				
Robert Schenck	X				
Perry Thurston	· X				
James Waldman	X				
Michael Weinstein	X				
Adam Hasner (Ex Officio)			X		
William Snyder (Chair)	X				
	Total Yeas: 13	Total Nays: 0			

#### **Appearances:**

HB 595 Open House Parties

Dwight Severs (General Public) - Proponent

1308 Riverside Dr

Titusville FL 32780 Phone: 321-383-5696

HB 595 Open House Parties

Laura McLeod, Executive Director (Lobbyist) - Proponent

Florida Association of DUI Programs, Inc.

1725 Mahan Drive Tallahassee FL 32308 Phone: 850-671-3384

HB 595 Open House Parties

Mark Fontaine, Executive Director (Lobbyist) - Proponent

Florida Alcohol & Drug Abuse Association

2868 Mahan Drive Tallahassee FL 32308 Phone: 850-878-2196

Print Date: 3/22/2010 5:33 pm

#### **Criminal & Civil Justice Policy Council**

3/22/2010 1:00:00PM

Location: 404 HOB

CS/HB 829 : Local Government

X Favorable With Council Substitute

	Yea	Nay	No Vote	Absentee Yea	Absentee Nay
Sandra Adams	X				
Kevin Ambler			X		
Carl Domino	X				
Eric Eisnaugle			X		
Adam M. Fetterman	X				
Luis Garcia		X			
Audrey Gibson	X				
Eduardo Gonzalez	X				
Tom Grady	X				
Doug Holder	X				
Julio Robaina	X				
Robert Schenck	X				
Perry Thurston	X				
James Waldman	X				
Michael Weinstein	X				
Adam Hasner (Ex Officio)			X		
William Snyder (Chair)	X				
	Total Yeas: 13	Total Nays: 1			

#### **Appearances:**

HB 829 Local Government
Jess McCarty, Assistant County Attorney (Lobbyist) - Proponent
Miami-Dade County
111 NW 1st Street

Miami FL

Phone: 305-979-7110

Print Date: 3/22/2010 5:33 pm

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	COUNCIL/COMMITTEE ACTION
	ADOPTED (Y/N)
	ADOPTED AS AMENDED (Y/N)
	ADOPTED W/O OBJECTION $\underline{\hspace{1cm}}$ (Y/N) $\underline{\hspace{1cm}}$ $\underline{\hspace{1cm}}$ $\underline{\hspace{1cm}}$ $\underline{\hspace{1cm}}$ $\underline{\hspace{1cm}}$ $\underline{\hspace{1cm}}$ $\underline{\hspace{1cm}}$ $\underline{\hspace{1cm}}$
	ADOPTED (Y/N) ADOPTED AS AMENDED (Y/N) ADOPTED W/O OBJECTION (Y/N) FAILED TO ADOPT (Y/N)
	WITHDRAWN (Y/N)
	OTHER
1	Council/Committee hearing bill: Criminal & Civil Justice Policy
2	Council
3	Representative(s) Bovo offered the following:
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5	Amendment (with title amendment)
6	Remove line 26 and insert:
7	2. Negotiate the lease of real property, other than an
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0	
.1	TITLE AMENDMENT
2	Remove line 4 and insert:
3	negotiate the lease of certain real property for a

#### **Criminal & Civil Justice Policy Council**

3/22/2010 1:00:00PM

Location: 404 HOB

**CS/HB 1101: Misdemeanor Pretrial Substance Abuse Programs** 

X Favorable

Print Date: 3/22/2010 5:33 pm

	Yea	Nay	No Vote	Absentee	Absentee
	X			Yea	Nay
Sandra Adams			.,,	<del></del>	
Kevin Ambler	X				
Carl Domino	X				
Eric Eisnaugle	X				
Adam M. Fetterman	X				
Luis Garcia	X				
Audrey Gibson	X				
Eduardo Gonzalez	X				
Tom Grady	X				
Doug Holder	X				
Julio Robaina	X				
Robert Schenck	X		<u> </u>		
Perry Thurston	X				
James Waldman	X				
Michael Weinstein	X			·	
Adam Hasner (Ex Officio)			X		
William Snyder (Chair)	X				
	Total Yeas: 16	Total Nays: 0			

#### **Criminal & Civil Justice Policy Council**

3/22/2010 1:00:00PM

Location: 404 HOB

**HB 1517 : Criminal Trials** 

X Favorable With Council Substitute

	Yea	Nay	No Vote	Absentee	Absentee
		•		Yea	Nay
Sandra Adams				Х	
Kevin Ambler		X			1
Carl Domino	Х				
Eric Eisnaugle	X				
Adam M. Fetterman	X				
Luis Garcia	X				
Audrey Gibson		X			
Eduardo Gonzalez	X				
Tom Grady	X				
Doug Holder	X				
Julio Robaina	X				
Robert Schenck	X				
Perry Thurston		X			
James Waldman	X				
Michael Weinstein	X				
Adam Hasner (Ex Officio)	X				
William Snyder (Chair)	X				
	Total Yeas: 13	Total Nays: 3	<b>;</b>		

#### **Appearances:**

HB 1517 Criminal Trials

Bob Dillinger, Public Defender, 6th (State Employee) - Opponent

Public Defender Association Criminal Justice Center Clearwater FL 33762

Phone: 727-464-6865

HB 1517 Criminal Trials

Jeff Takacs, Legislative Coordinator - Proponent

Attorney General's Office PL-01, The Capitol Tallahassee FL 32399 Phone: 850-245-0155

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# COUNCIL/COMMITTEE ACTION ADOPTED \_\_ (Y/N) ADOPTED AS AMENDED \_\_ (Y/N) ADOPTED W/O OBJECTION \_\_ (Y/N) FAILED TO ADOPT \_\_ (Y/N) WITHDRAWN \_\_ (Y/N) OTHER

Council/Committee hearing bill: Criminal & Civil Justice Policy Council

Representative(s) Eisnaugle offered the following:

#### Amendment (with title amendment)

Remove everything after the enacting clause and insert: Section 1. Section 918.015, Florida Statutes, is amended to read:

918.015 Right to speedy trial.-

- (1) <u>RIGHT.-</u>In all criminal prosecutions the state and the defendant shall each have the right to a speedy trial.
- (2) FINDINGS; INTENT.—The Legislature finds that Rule 3.191, Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, is substantive in character in every respect where it compels strict enforcement of time periods for prosecutions of persons accused of crimes, where it grants the benefits of its provisions to persons upon arrest or service of a notice to appear, regardless of whether formal charges are filed, where it continues application of the time limitations where the state enters a nolle prosequi of the

Amendment No. 1 20 charge, and where it operates to circumvent and preclude the 21 filing for formal charges within the statute of limitations 22 periods for appropriate offenses. To the extent that these and 23 all other substantive effects of rules of court regarding the 24 speedy trial of persons charged with crimes expand, alter, or 25 enlarge the constitutional right to speedy trial, the 26 Legislature adopts the provisions of this section to govern a 27 defendant's right to speedy trial. This section shall govern 28 unless the Supreme Court declares this section or a provision 29 thereof to be procedural. To the extent any provision of this 30 section is found procedural, all remaining provisions shall 31 supersede any court rule in conflict with such remaining 32 substantive provisions. In the event the Supreme Court adopts a 33 rule of procedure to replace this section, or any portion of 34 this section, such rule shall neither abridge, enlarge, or 35 modify the constitutional right to a speedy trial nor require a 36 dismissal of the charge with prejudice where no substantive 37 violation of the constitutional right to a speedy trial has 38 occurred. It is the intent of the Legislature that the 39 principles and findings described in this subsection similarly 40 apply with respect to juveniles charged with delinquent acts and 41 to the provisions of s. 985.36. The Supreme Court shall, by rule 42 of said court, provide procedures through which the right to a 43 speedy trial as guaranteed by subsection (1) and by s. 16, Art.

(3) SPEEDY TRIAL GENERAL PROVISIONS.—Except as otherwise provided, and subject to the limitations imposed under subsections (10) and (11), a person charged with a felony by

I of the State Constitution, shall be realized.

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Amendment No. 1 indictment or in

- indictment or information, or in the case of a misdemeanor by whatever document constitutes a formal charge, shall be brought to trial within the following time periods:
  - (a) Ninety days after the filing of a misdemeanor;
- (b) One hundred eighty days after the filing of a first, second, or third degree felony;
- (c) Two hundred seventy five days after the filing of a first degree felony punishable by imprisonment for a term of years not exceeding life or a life felony; or
- (d) Three hundred sixty five days after the filing of a capital felony.

This subsection does not apply whenever a motion requesting application of the speedy trial time periods has been granted under subsection (4) or when the state files a no information indicating its intent not to file formal charges.

- (4) REQUEST FOR SPEEDY TRIAL TIME PERIODS.—Except as otherwise provided in this section, and subject to the limitations imposed under subsections (10) and (11), a person charged with a felony by indictment or information, or in the case of a misdemeanor by whatever document constitutes a formal charge, may file a motion with the trial court requesting application of the speedy trial time periods under this subsection.
- (a) An order granting a motion under this subsection requires the defendant to be brought to trial within the following time periods:

(2010)

#### Amendment No. 1

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- 1. Sixty days from the date of an order granting the motion for a misdemeanor;
- 2. One hundred twenty days from the date of an order granting the motion for a first, second or third degree felony;
- 3. One hundred ninety days from the date of an order granting the motion for a first degree felony punishable by imprisonment for a term of years not exceeding life or a life felony; or
- 4. Two hundred seventy five days from the date of an order granting the motion for a capital felony.
- (b) A motion requesting application of the speedy trial time periods shall be considered a pleading that the defendant is available for trial, has diligently investigated the case, and is prepared or will be prepared for trial within 20 days after filing the motion. If granted, the motion binds the defendant and the state. No motion requesting application of the speedy trial time periods shall be filed or served unless the defendant has a bona fide desire to obtain a trial sooner than otherwise might be provided.
- (c) A motion requesting application of the speedy trial time periods shall be granted by the court unless the court determines:
- No document constituting a formal charge has been filed with the court;
- The defendant is not or will not be prepared for trial within 20 days after filing the motion; or
- 3. The factual circumstances, seriousness, or complexity of the case are such that the applicable time period provided

- under this paragraph is insufficient to allow the state or defense adequate time to prepare the case for trial.
- (d) A motion requesting application of the speedy trial time periods may be re-filed not less than 30 days after a denial of a previous motion requesting application of the speedy trial time periods.
- (e) An order granting a motion requesting application of the speedy trial time periods may only be vacated with consent of the state or for good cause shown. Good cause for vacating an order granted under this subsection and granting subsequent requests for continuances on behalf of the defendant thereafter shall not include nonreadiness for trial, except as to matters that may arise after the motion requesting application of the speedy trial time periods was filed and that reasonably could not have been anticipated by the defendant or counsel for the defendant.
- (5) EXTENSIONS OF TIME.—Extension of the time periods under subsections (3) and (4) may be granted under the following circumstances:
- (a) Unexpected illness, unexpected incapacity, or unforeseeable and unavoidable absence of a person whose presence or testimony is uniquely necessary for a full and adequate trial;
- (b) A showing by the state that the case is so unusual and so complex, because of the number of defendants or the nature of the prosecution or otherwise, that it is unreasonable to expect adequate investigation or preparation within the prescribed time periods;

- (c) A showing by the state that specific evidence or testimony is not available despite diligent efforts to secure it, but will become available within a reasonable time;
- (d) A showing by the defendant or the state of necessity for delay grounded on developments that could not have been anticipated and that will materially affect the trial;
- (e) A showing that a delay is necessary to accommodate a codefendant, when there is reason to not sever the cases to proceed promptly with trial of the defendant;
- (f) A showing by the state that the defendant has caused major delay or disruption of preparation of proceedings, such as preventing the attendance of witnesses or otherwise;
- (g) Other exceptional circumstances exist which, as a matter of substantial justice to the defendant or the state or both, require an extension;
- (h) The state and defense have signed a stipulation for an extension;
- (i) The defendant establishes good cause to grant an extension without waiving his or her right to speedy trial; or
- (j) The court determines there exists a reasonable and necessary period of delay resulting from proceedings including but not limited to an examination and hearing to determine the mental competency or physical ability of the defendant to stand trial, for hearings on pretrial motions, for appeals by the state, for review by the state under extraordinary writ, for DNA testing ordered on the defendant's behalf upon defendant's motion specifying the physical evidence to be tested under s.

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- 158 925.12(2), and for trial of other pending criminal charges 159 against the defendant.
  - (6) WAIVER OF SPEEDY TRIAL PERIODS.—The time periods of this section shall be deemed waived by the defendant when any of the following occurs:
  - (a) A defendant who has not filed a motion requesting application of the speedy trial time periods under subsection (4) moves for a continuance.
  - (b) A defendant who has filed a motion requesting application of the speedy trial time periods under subsection (4) moves for a continuance and the motion is granted.
    - (c) The defendant is unavailable for trial.
  - (d) The defendant agrees to provide substantial assistance to the state or law enforcement while his or her case is pending.
  - (e) The state proves by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has caused major delay or disruption of preparation of proceedings, such as preventing the attendance of witnesses or otherwise.
    - (7) MOTION FOR SPEEDY TRIAL.-
  - (a) A motion for speedy trial may be filed after the time periods under subsections (3) or (4), or any period of extension granted by the court, have expired.
  - (b) For purposes of calculating the time periods of this section, the filing date of the initial formal charging document shall be the only event which commences the running of speedy trial periods except as provided in subsections (4) and (10). In the event an information or indictment is filed in lieu of

charges initially brought by citation, notice to appear or any other document which serves a charging document, the time period shall commence from the date of filing of the citation, notice to appear or other document serving as a charging document, but the applicable time period shall be the period which adheres to the charge as filed by information or indictment. No later than 5 days after the date of filing the motion for speedy trial, the court shall hold a hearing on the motion.

- (c) A motion for speedy trial shall be granted unless it is shown that:
- 1. The failure to hold the trial is attributable to the defendant, a codefendant in the same trial, or their counsel;
  - 2. The defendant was unavailable for trial;
- 3. The applicable time period or extension granted by the court has not expired; or
- 4. The defendant is not prepared to proceed to trial within 10 days after the hearing on the motion for speedy trial.

If the court finds that none of the reasons set forth in this paragraph exist, it shall grant the motion and order the defendant brought to trial within 10 days unless the court in its discretion authorizes a longer time period of up to 30 days.

(d) A defendant not brought to trial within the 10-day period or other time period prescribed by the court, through no fault of the defendant or the defendant's counsel, may file a motion for dismissal under subsection (8). A person will be considered to have been brought to trial if the trial commences within the required time period. For purposes of this paragraph,

a trial is considered commenced when the jury panel for that specific trial has been sworn after voir dire examination and selection or, on waiver of a jury trial, when the proceedings begin before the judge.

#### (8) MOTION FOR DISMISSAL.-

- (a) A defendant whose motion for speedy trial has been granted and who has not been brought to trial pursuant to subsection (7) may file a motion for dismissal of all charges and of any uncharged crime arising out the same criminal episode. A dismissal granted solely due to the failure to bring the defendant to trial before the expiration of the applicable time periods shall be without prejudice. A motion for dismissal with prejudice may be ordered if the defendant filed a motion requesting application of the speedy trial time periods under subsection (4) and such motion was granted, and:
- 1. The length of delay was substantially beyond the applicable time periods and has materially prejudiced the defendant in his or her defense. Prejudice may be established where the defendant can show by clear and convincing evidence that while outside applicable time period, or during any extended period authorized by the court, an essential witness has died or has become unavailable through no fault of the defendant, the defendant's counsel, or anyone acting on behalf of the defendant or his or her counsel. An essential witness means a witness possessing exculpatory information that cannot be provided by another witness of comparable credibility, or a witness who is essential to explain, identify, or introduce admissible evidence the defendant intended to introduce at

- trial. Prejudice may also be established where the defendant can show by clear and convincing evidence that exculpatory evidence known to the defense during the applicable time periods has been destroyed, substantially degraded, lost, or become unavailable through no fault of the defendant, the defendant's counsel, or anyone acting on behalf of the defendant or his or her counsel; or
- 2. The delay has otherwise constituted a substantive violation of the defendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial.

An order granting a dismissal with prejudice under this paragraph must specify factual findings in support of its conclusion.

- (b)1. Charges filed by the state after a dismissal without prejudice arising out the same criminal episode that was the subject of dismissal may not include a new charge or any charge of a higher degree that was not previously dismissed. This subparagraph does not prohibit amendment of the charging document as necessary to correct errors or deficiencies which do not add a new charge or increase the degree of severity of a charged offense.
- 2. If a nolle prosequi is filed after the expiration of the applicable time period under subsection (3) or subsection (4) or provided in any court-prescribed extension, charges based on the same criminal episode filed after such nolle prosequi may not include any new charge or any charge of a higher degree that was not previously the subject of the nolle prosequi. This

subparagraph does not prohibit amendment of the charging document as necessary to correct errors or deficiencies which do not add a new charge or increase the degree of severity of a charged offense.

- 3. A trial on re-filed charges arising out of the same criminal episode filed after a dismissal without prejudice or after a nolle prosequi entered as described in subparagraph 2. must be commenced within 60 days for a misdemeanor offense and 120 days for a felony offense. If the state fails to bring the defendant to trial on such re-filed charges as required under this subparagraph through no fault of the defendant, the defendant's counsel, or anyone acting on behalf of the defendant or his or her counsel, the court shall dismiss the charges with prejudice.
  - (c) The state may appeal a dismissal with prejudice.
- (9) AVAILABILITY FOR TRIAL.—A defendant is unavailable for trial if the defendant or his or her counsel fails to attend a proceeding at which either's presence is required by this section or the defendant or his or her counsel is not ready for trial on the date trial is scheduled. No presumption of unavailability attaches, but if the state objects to a motion for speedy trial and presents any evidence tending to show the defendant's unavailability, the defendant must establish, by competent proof, availability during the applicable time period.
- (10) PRISONERS OUTSIDE JURISDICTION.—A person who is in federal custody or incarcerated in a jail or correctional institution outside the jurisdiction of this state or a subdivision thereof is not entitled to the benefit of this

section until that person is returned to the jurisdiction of the court in this state within which a charge is pending or within which a charge is to be filed upon such person's return and until written notice of the person's return is filed with the court and served on the prosecutor. For these persons, the time period under subsection (3) commences on the date the last act required under this subsection occurs and the time period under subsection (4) commences on the date an order granting a motion requesting application of the speedy trial time periods is entered following the completion of all acts required under this subsection. If the acts required under this subsection do not precede the issuance of an order granting a motion requesting application of the speedy trial time periods, the order granting the motion is a nullity.

- (11) APPLICABILITY OF TIME PERIODS— When multiple counts are charged, the applicable time period is the period applicable to the highest degree of offense.
- person who is to be tried again or whose trial has been delayed by an appeal by the state or the defendant shall be brought to trial within 60 days in the case of a misdemeanor and within 120 days in the case of a felony after the date of declaration of a mistrial by the trial court, the date of an order by the trial court granting a new trial, the date of an order by the trial court granting a motion in arrest of judgment, or the date of receipt by the trial court of a mandate, order, or notice of whatever form from a reviewing court that makes possible a new trial for the defendant, whichever is last in time. If a

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defendant is not brought to trial within the prescribed time period, the defendant may file a motion for speedy trial under subsection (7).

(13) PERIOD FOR NEW OR RE-FILED CHARGES AFTER NO INFORMATION, NO TRUE BILL, OR AFTER A TIMELY NOLLE PROSEQUI .-This section does not prohibit the state from filing any criminal charge after the entry of a no information or no true bill at any time within the statute of limitations period for such offense. This section does not prohibit the re-filing of any original charges or any new charges after the entry of a nolle prosequi when such charges are filed within the statute of limitations period for such offense, if the nolle prosequi was filed prior to the expiration of the time periods provided in subsection (3) or subsection (4) or, in the case of an extension granted by the court, prior to the expiration of the court's extended time period. The speedy trial period for new or refiled charges shall be the balance of days remaining on the speedy trial period of the charge or charges that were the subject of the nolle prosequi or 60 days for a misdemeanor offense and 120 days for a felony offense, whichever is greater. If the state fails to bring the defendant to trial on such refiled charges within the time periods provided under this subsection through no fault of the defendant, the defendant's counsel, or anyone acting on behalf of the defendant or his or her counsel, the court shall dismiss the charges with prejudice.

Section 2. Subsection (1) of section 985.35, Florida Statutes, is amended to read:

985.35 Adjudicatory hearings; withheld adjudications; orders of adjudication.—

- (1) The adjudicatory hearing must be held as soon as practicable after the petition alleging that a child has committed a delinquent act or violation of law is filed and in accordance with <u>s. 985.36</u> the Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure; but reasonable delay for the purpose of investigation, discovery, or procuring counsel or witnesses shall be granted. If the child is being detained, the time limitations in s. 985.26(2) and (3) apply.
- Section 3. Section 985.36, Florida Statutes, is created to read:

# 985.36 Juvenile right to speedy trial.-

- (1) TIME.—If a petition has been filed alleging a juvenile to have committed a delinquent act, the juvenile shall be brought to an adjudicatory hearing within 90 days after the earlier of the following:
  - (a) The date the juvenile was taken into custody; or
- (b) The date of service of the summons that is issued when the petition is filed.
- (2) EXTENSIONS OF TIME.—Extension of the time period under subsection (1) may be granted under the following circumstances:
- (a) Unexpected illness, unexpected incapacity, or unforeseeable and unavoidable absence of a person whose presence or testimony is uniquely necessary for a full and adequate trial;
- 379 (b) A showing by the state that the case is so unusual and so complex, because of the number of persons charged or the

nature of the prosecution or otherwise, that it is unreasonable to expect adequate investigation or preparation within the prescribed time period;

- (c) A showing by the state that specific evidence or testimony is not available despite diligent efforts to secure it, but will become available within a reasonable time;
- (d) A showing by the defense or the state of necessity for delay grounded on developments that could not have been anticipated and that will materially affect the trial;
- (e) A showing that a delay is necessary to accommodate a codefendant, when there is reason to not sever the cases to proceed promptly with trial of the juvenile;
- (f) A showing by the state that the juvenile has caused major delay or disruption of preparation of proceedings, such as by preventing the attendance of witnesses or otherwise.
- (g) Other exceptional circumstances exist which, as a matter of substantial justice to the juvenile or the state or both, require an extension;
- (h) The state and defense have signed a stipulation for an extension;
- (i) The juvenile establishes good cause to grant an extension without waiving his or her right to speedy trial; or
- (j) The court determines there exists a reasonable and necessary period of delay resulting from proceedings including but not limited to an examination and hearing to determine the mental competency or physical ability of the juvenile to stand for the adjudicatory hearing, for hearings on pretrial motions, for appeals by the state, for review by the state under

extraordinary writ, and for adjudicatory hearings of other pending charges against the juvenile.

- (3) WAIVER OF SPEEDY TRIAL PERIODS.—The time periods of this section shall be deemed waived by the juvenile when any of the following occurs:
  - (a) The juvenile moves for a continuance.
  - (b) The juvenile is unavailable for trial.
- (c) The juvenile agrees to provide substantial assistance to the state or law enforcement while his or her case is pending.
- (d) The state proves by clear and convincing evidence that the juvenile has caused major delay or disruption of preparation of proceedings, such as by preventing the attendance of witnesses or otherwise.
- (4) MOTION FOR SPEEDY TRIAL.—A motion for speedy trial may be filed after the time period under subsection (1) or any period of extension granted by the court has expired. No later than 5 days after the date of filing the motion for speedy trial, the court shall hold a hearing on the motion. A motion for speedy trial shall be granted unless it is shown that:
- (a) The failure to hold the adjudicatory hearing is attributable to the juvenile, a codefendant in the same case, or their counsel;
  - (b) The juvenile was unavailable for trial;
- (c) The time period or extension granted by the court has not expired; or
- (d) The juvenile is not prepared to proceed to trial within 10 days after the hearing on the motion for speedy trial.

If the court finds that none of the reasons set forth in this subsection exist, it shall grant the motion and order the juvenile to be brought to an adjudicatory hearing within 10 days. A juvenile not brought to his or her adjudicatory hearing within the 10-day period, through no fault of the juvenile or the juvenile's counsel, may file a motion for dismissal under subsection (5). A juvenile will be considered to have been brought to his or her adjudicatory hearing if the hearing commences within the required time period. For purposes of this subsection, the adjudicatory hearing is considered commenced when the proceedings begin before the judge.

- (5) MOTION FOR DISMISSAL.-
- (a) A juvenile whose motion for speedy trial has been granted and who has not been brought to an adjudicatory hearing under subsection (4) may file a motion for dismissal of the petition and of any uncharged delinquent act arising out the same criminal episode. If the state failed to bring the juvenile to an adjudicatory hearing as required under subsection (4) through no fault of the juvenile or the juvenile's counsel, the court may, in its discretion, dismiss the charge without prejudice, or with prejudice if the court finds good cause exists which warrants permanent dismissal of the petition based on consideration of the following factors:
  - 1. The length of the delay.
  - 2. The circumstances and reason for the delay.
- 3. The seriousness of the charge.
- 4. The degree of prejudice to the defense.

An order dismissing a petition with prejudice under this paragraph must be in writing and supported by facts which support a finding that the length of the delay was unreasonable and that the prejudice to the juvenile diminished his or her defense in a material way.

- (b) 1. Charges filed by the state after a dismissal without prejudice arising out the same criminal episode that was the subject of dismissal may not include any new charge or any charge of a higher degree that was not previously dismissed. This subsection does not prohibit amendment of the petition as necessary to correct errors or deficiencies which do not add a new charge or increase the degree of severity of a charged offense.
- 2. If a nolle prosequi is filed after the expiration of the time period specified in subsection (1), charges based on the same criminal episode filed after such nolle prosequi may not include any new charge or any charge of a higher degree that was not previously the subject of the nolle prosequi. This subsection does not prohibit amendment of the petition as necessary to correct errors or deficiencies which do not add a new charge or increase the degree of severity of a charged offense.
- 3. An adjudicatory hearing on re-filed charges arising out the same criminal episode filed after a dismissal without prejudice or after a nolle prosequi entered as described in subparagraph 2. must be commenced within 60 days. If the state fails to bring the juvenile to an adjudicatory hearing on such

re-filed charges as required under this subparagraph through no fault of the juvenile or juvenile's counsel, the court shall dismiss the charges with prejudice.

- (c) The state may appeal a dismissal with prejudice.
- (6) AVAILABILITY FOR TRIAL.—A juvenile is unavailable for trial if the juvenile or his or her counsel fails to attend a proceeding at which either's presence is required by this section, or the juvenile or his or her counsel is not ready for the adjudicatory hearing on the date it is scheduled. No presumption of unavailability attaches, but if the state objects to a motion for speedy trial and presents any evidence tending to show the juvenile's unavailability, the juvenile must establish, by competent proof, availability during the time period.
- (7) INCOMPETENCY OF JUVENILE.—Upon the filing of a motion to declare the juvenile incompetent, the speedy trial period shall be tolled until a subsequent finding of the court that the child is competent to proceed.
- (8) EFFECT OF MISTRIAL; APPEAL; ORDER OF NEW TRIAL.—A juvenile who is to have another adjudicatory hearing or whose adjudicatory hearing has been delayed by an appeal by the state or the defense shall be brought to an adjudicatory hearing within 60 days after the date of declaration of a mistrial by the trial court, the date of an order by the trial court granting a new trial, the date of an order by the trial court granting a motion in arrest of judgment, or the date of receipt by the trial court of a mandate, order, or notice of whatever form from a reviewing court that makes possible a new trial for

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the respondent, whichever is last in time. If a juvenile is not brought to an adjudicatory hearing within the prescribed time period, the juvenile may file a motion for speedy trial under subsection (5).

PERIOD FOR NEW OR RE-FILED CHARGES AFTER NO PETITION OR TIMELY NOLLE PROSEQUI. - This section does not prohibit the state from filing a petition after the entry of a no petition at any time within the statute of limitations period for such offense if the person who is the subject of the petition remains under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court the day a new petition is filed. This section does not prohibit the re-filing of any original charges or any new charges after the entry of a nolle prosegui when such charges are filed within the statute of limitations period for such offense, if the nolle prosequi was filed prior to the expiration of the time period provided in subsection (1) and if the person who is the subject of the new charges in the petition remains under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court the day a new petition is filed. The speedy trial period for new or re-filed charges shall be the balance of days remaining on the speedy trial period of the charge or charges that were the subject of the nolle prosequi or 60 days, whichever is greater. If the state fails to bring the juvenile to trial on such re-filed charges as required under this subparagraph through no fault of the juvenile, the juvenile's counsel, or anyone acting on behalf of the juvenile or his or her counsel, the court shall dismiss the petition with prejudice.

Section 4. Rule 3.191, Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, is repealed.

Section 5. Rule 8.090, Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure is repealed.

Section 6. This act shall take effect upon becoming law, but sections 4 and 5 of this act shall take effect only if this act is enacted by a two-thirds vote of the membership of each house of the Legislature.

## TITLE AMENDMENT

Remove the entire title and insert:

An act relating to criminal trials; amending s.

918.015, F.S.; providing legislative findings and intent concerning speedy trial requirements; specifying periods for commencement of a trial absent a demand for a speedy trial; specifying periods for commencement of a trial when a request for application of speedy trial periods is made; providing grounds for denial of such a motion; providing for vacation of such a motion upon good cause; providing for extensions of time; providing requirements for a speedy trial motion; providing for dismissal of charges if a defendant is not brought to trial within the time period prescribed by the court; providing requirements for motions for dismissal; providing limitations on re-filing of charges following a dismissal without prejudice;

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providing requirements for orders dismissing charges with prejudice; providing factors to be considered in determining whether charges should be dismissed with prejudice; providing for determination of whether a defendant is available for trial for purposes of speedy trial provisions; providing for application of provisions to prisoners outside the jurisdiction; providing for applicability when a defendant is charged with both felony and misdemeanor offenses; providing for applicability when a defendant is charged with more than one felony providing for the effect of appeals; providing for retrial after declaration of a mistrial; providing for application to new or re-filed charges after timely nolle prosequi; deleting reference to a rule of the Supreme Court concerning speedy trials; amending s. 985.35, F.S.; providing that adjudicatory hearings for juveniles must be held in accordance with a specified statute relating to speedy trials rather than according to specified court rules; creating s. 985.36, F.S.; providing a time period for juvenile adjudicatory hearings; providing for extensions of time; providing for waiver of speedy trial period; providing for motions for speedy trial; providing for motions for dismissal; providing for dismissal of charges if a juvenile is not brought to trial within the time period prescribed by the court; providing requirements for motions for dismissal; providing limitations on re-filing of charges following a

dismissal without prejudice; providing requirements for orders dismissing charges with prejudice; providing factors to be considered in determining whether charges should be dismissed with prejudice; providing for determination of whether a juvenile is available for trial for purposes of speedy trial provisions; providing of tolling of speedy trial period during the determination of a juvenile's competency; providing for the effect of a declaration of a mistrial, an appeal, or an order for a new trial; providing for application to new or re-filed charges after timely nolle prosequi; repealing Rule 3.191, Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, relating to speedy trials; repealing Rule 8.090, Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure, relating to speedy trials in juvenile proceedings; providing a contingent effective date.

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WHEREAS, Section 16, Article I of the State Constitution and the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provide persons accused of crimes a right to speedy trial, and

WHEREAS, the United States Supreme Court has explicitly stated that there is "no constitutional basis for holding that the speedy trial right can be quantified into a specified number of days or months." (Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 523 (1972)), and

WHEREAS, the Legislature finds that there is no basis in the State Constitution or the United States Constitution to permanently and forever discharge a defendant for a crime based Amendment No. 1 solely upon the expiration of strict time limits for criminal prosecutions when no substantive violation of the constitutional right to speedy trial has occurred, and

WHEREAS, the Legislature finds that Rule 3.191, Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, creates time periods for a speedy trial far stricter than necessary and that require courts to dismiss prosecutions against accused criminals who have suffered neither a violation of a constitutional right nor an unfair trial, and

WHEREAS, the Legislature finds that Rule 3.191, Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, is substantive in character by expanding a criminal defendant's right to speedy trial to a right to be forever discharged from his or her crime if not tried within a specific number of days and to attach that right upon a person's arrest even where the state attorney declines to file formal charges pending further investigation, NOW, THEREFORE,